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I. Introduction
The American system of jurisprudence attempts, albeit imperfectly at times,
to craft equitable resolutions for every wrong done to an individual or society.
To be successful in such a lofty endeavor, it has historically been necessary to
adhere to separate civil and criminal bodies of law. Only through this system can
courts be afforded the whole panoply of consequences to address the participants,
whether it be appropriate sentencing for criminal misconduct or appropriate
damages to the prevailing civil party, with judicial capacity to weigh the specifics
of every situation and to craft a resolution fitting of the facts.
Some legal scholars suggest elimination of the criminal aspect of law in
favor of a civil system, perhaps expanded to include more punitive civil
sanctions and, for some very compelling reasons, not the least of which is
simplicity and recognition of the already-blurred line between the two legal
systems.1 While this concept is workable in theory, it fails in reality. Notions of
subjective versus objective liability, wrongful acts versus harmful acts, punishment
versus compensation, stigma and incarceration versus restitution and monetary
damages, public versus private actors, and procedural and evidentiary standards
are all important, yet distinct, components of these legal systems that have been
developed because they engender appropriate and just results.2
“The abandonment of [a] clear dividing line in favor of a general assessment
of the manifold and complex purposes that lie behind a court’s action would create
novel problems where now there are rarely any novel problems that could infect
many different areas of the law.”3 Perhaps the greatest example of the differences

Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 Geo. L.J. 775, 783– 84 (1997).
1

2
See generally id.; Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795 (1992).
3

Mann, supra note 2, at 1796 (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636 –37 (1988)).
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between criminal and civil law can be seen in the suggested application of contract
law to the area of criminal sexual assault. An already complex area of law, criminal
sexual assault would become only more complicated—and more ambiguous—by
the application of contract law in its stead.
This Article introduces the concept of economic and utilitarian approaches
to jurisprudence while, in turn, emphasizing the appropriateness of the civilcriminal law distinctions with a focus on the realistic impracticalities of applying
contract law to criminal sexual assault.4 While, in theory, contract law can be
applied generally to several areas involving agreements—or lack thereof—to
partake in sexual relations, the reality is that harmony is interrupted. This Article
will first address the distinctions between criminal law and civil law, with a focus
on contract law.5 It will further analyze the intricacies of those distinctions, as
is evident in notions of consent versus assent, capacity, enforceability, damages,
and ambiguity.6 Finally, this Article will underline the need for the two legal
approaches through specific application of each to the marriage “contract.”7
Part II of this Article addresses economic theories of jurisprudence, with
an eye toward the distinctions, or lack thereof, between civil and criminal law
vis-à-vis those theories.8 Part III of this Article discusses the specific failures
of those economic models with respect to their application to sexual assault.9
More specifically, this Article comments upon the dichotomy of consent to
sexual intercourses versus assent to contract, notions of capacity, and issues with
enforceability (such as fraud, duress, and undue influence).10 This Article also
seeks to compare notions of damages between criminal sexual assault as compared
to breach of contract.11 Finally, the reality of the failure of economic models in
this situation is driven home through a discussion of the ambiguities that arrive
by an application of these jurisprudential theories, as uniquely demonstrated in
the context of marriage.12 In sum, favoring a contract-based approach to criminal
sexual assault—and an assessment of its consensual or nonconsensual nature—
would be akin to fitting a square peg into a round hole.

4

See infra notes 13–30, 31– 45, 46 –216 and accompanying text.

5

See infra notes 31– 45 and accompanying text.

6

See infra notes 46 –198 and accompanying text.

7

See infra notes 199 –216 and accompanying text.

8

See infra notes 13–30 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 31– 45 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 46 –159 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 160 –77 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 178–216 and accompanying text.
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II. Economic Theories of Jurisprudence: A Failure To Recognize
The Necessary Distinction Between Civil Law And Criminal Law
Before one can advocate for or argue against a contract-based approach
to evaluating sexual assault, one must understand that this approach has
its underpinnings in economics and, specifically, utilitarian theories of
jurisprudence.13 Hence, a rudimentary instruction in those various theories
is necessary.
An economic theory of jurisprudence applies economic principles to the
practice of law, asserting that the tools of economic reasoning offer the best
approach for a justified and consistent application of law.14 More specifically,
this theory views the law as “a social tool that promotes economic efficiency,”
and “that economic analysis and efficiency as an ideal can guide legal practice.”15
Utilitarianism, a subset of the economic theories of jurisprudence, suggests the
possibility of controlling parties by placing costs on them in the civil law sphere,
thereby eliminating (or reducing) the need for criminal sanctions.16 Judge Posner
put it this way:
In cases where [civil] remedies are an adequate deterrent, because
optimal [civil] damages, including any punitive damages, are
within the ability to pay of the potential defendant, there is no
need to invoke criminal penalties. . . . The criminal (= tortious)
conduct probably will be deterred . . . . [C]riminal sanctions
generally are reserved, as theory predicts, for cases where the
[civil] remedy bumps up against a solvency limitation.17
Accordingly, those who subscribe to this philosophy shift traditional notions
of law and instead, believe that the law exists to manipulate behavior in order
“to achieve the greatest good.”18 This theory “bridge[s] the gap between criminal
and civil law.”19 Under this philosophy, the idea is that “the more severe the
sanction, the greater its deterrent effect.”20 Thus, the notion of compensating
See Robert D. Rachlin, Growing Old with Judge Posner, 29 Vt. B.J. 20, 20 (2003);
Peter J. Hammond, The Economics of Justice and the Criterion of Wealth Maximization, 91 Yale
L.J. 1493, 1499–500 (1982) (reviewing Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (1981)).
13

14
Brian E. Butler, Law and Economics, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://
www.iep.utm.edu/law-econ/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019); see also Rachlin, supra note 13, at 20;
Hammond, supra note 13, at 1499–500.
15

Butler, supra note 14.

16

Mann, supra note 2, at 1846– 47.

Id. (third, fourth, and fifth alteration in original) (citing Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 205 (3d ed. 1986)).
17

18

Id. at 1845.

19

Id.

20

Id. (footnote omitted).
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an already-injured party with monetary damages is replaced with the assertion
that an obligation to pay serves as a preventive disincentive to causing injury.21
This approach is indeed a fair one, and is embraced by many scholars as there
is nothing inherently flawed by a social utility argument when it comes to the
abolition of the criminal-civil law distinction.
No matter the exact economic or utilitarian theory to which one subscribes,
and there are too many to mention here,22 the application of contract law to
sexual intercourse and assault stems from an economic approach to the study of
law. The impact of such application has been noticed:
In recent years economists have become very bold. Once
primarily concerned with such mundane matters as how
consumers allocate their budgets between food and clothing
and whether a person should be charged to cross a bridge, they
are now invading territories formerly regarded as outside the
realm of their discipline—suicide, religion and ethics, marriage
and family planning. An area ripe for further incursion is
that niche of knowledge normally associated with the lawyer.
Although little of this niche is intelligible to the uninitiated,
including the economist, this has not inhibited economists from
employing their tools to analyze problems of a legal nature.
In the last decade over two hundred professional articles have
appeared which apply economic analysis to topics such as
property rights, liability rules, defective products, automobile
accidents, crime control, jury conscription, breach of contract,
the court system, contingent fees, and class action suits. Much
of this literature is inaccessible to the average lawyer because it
is technically sophisticated, interdisciplinary, or oriented towards
doctrinal controversies.23
With an understanding of how this economic or utilitarian approach applies
to the various bodies of law, scholars have long debated the distinctions between
criminal and civil law, and whether those differences should be blended into a
single approach to resolve societal issues of harm.24

21

Id. at 1845–46.

Economic models include concepts such as various definitions of and approaches to
efficiency, game theory, public choice theory, various methods of measuring utilitarianism, and
behavioral economics. Butler, supra note 14.
22

23
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer’s Guide to
Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1655, 1655–56 (1974) (footnotes omitted). See
also id. at 1656 n.4.
24

See, e.g., id.; Mann, supra note 2.
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The economic model relies on two interconnected principles: deterrence
and efficiency.25 Deterrence means preventing or limiting certain kinds of
behavior. Criminal punishment (incarceration) is considered to serve a greater
deterrent role than, say, monetary sanctions. Efficiency means behavior that
improves the allocation of resources without making another person “worse
off.”26 Under the economic model, nonmonetary sanctions (imprisonment) are
considered optimal for deterring criminal behavior while monetary damages
are optimal for tort breaches.27 This conclusion is derived from the notion that
there are different levels of efficiency for torts and crimes. By way of explanation,
voluntary, compensated transactions are considered a more efficient method of
allocating resources than involuntary ones, in large part because the transaction
costs are lower for the former.28 Accordingly, the purpose of criminal punishment
is to prevent individuals from bypassing the marketplace (the system of voluntary
exchanges) for forced exchanges that occur through criminal conduct.29 Even still,
tort law, with its privately enforced suits for monetary damages, cannot entirely
deter the “bypassing” that occurs with crime. But, because the underlying tort
activity is considered more “efficient” (because of its borderline voluntary nature
and lower transaction costs) it requires less deterrence. The contrary is true with
crimes. As a result, under this economic theory, society should be more motivated
to deter criminal activity than tortious activity, as arguably it is not efficient
whatsoever. The result is represented in the common phrase that “criminal law
punishes while tort law prices.”30 And it is under this theory, and only under
this theory, that a contract-rape comparison can be made. But even there, the
comparison remains distinctly flawed when it comes to considerations of sexual
assault, as economic models fail to recognize the fundamental and eternal
differences in the two legal paradigms.

25
Monu Bedi, Contract Breaches and the Criminal/Civil Divide: An Inter-Common Law
Analysis, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 559, 582 (2012).
26

Id. at 582– 83.

27

Id. at 583.

Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193,
1195 (1985).
28

29
Judge Posner, the chief proponent of this argument, uses the example of coveting a
neighbor’s car:

It is more efficient to negotiate with the neighbor for the car than simply taking
it. Stealing the car cannot improve the allocation of resources, nor can it “move
resources from a less to a more valuable employment” because the person taking
the car is not willing to pay an agreed upon price. Moreover, if the perpetrator
is allowed to take the car, she will expend resources to do so, which will increase
the victim’s incentive to expend resources to prevent the car from being taken.
This activity will increase net expenditures, with no social benefit. So, stealing is
inefficient, and it is in society’s interest to deter it.
Bedi, supra note 25, at 576–77 (footnotes omitted).
30

See id. at 563 (footnote omitted).
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A. The General Failures of The Economic Models: Fundamental Differences
In Civil Law And Criminal Law
Indeed, “[m]uch ink has been spilled on the civil/criminal distinction, and,
in recent years, on its precipitous decline.”31 Yet, there are very real reasons to
distinguish between civil and criminal law. Criminal law is different from civil
law for a number of important reasons: criminal law has multiple procedural
protections designed in part to signify the difference in kind to society, such as a
trial by jury, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, ex post facto
protections, and regularization under the Eighth Amendment’s requirements of
standards for sentencing. Criminal law carries consequences such as the loss of
critical civil rights and other societal costs upon conviction, such as the loss of
benefits and the exclusion from multiple professions and jobs.32
Not only are there basic differences in due process concepts and constitutional rights attendant to criminal matters that are absent in their civil
counterparts, but the basic notions of the burdens of proof and the culpable
mental states of the actors are dramatically different as well.33 A stronger concept
of proximate cause is required to sustain a criminal conviction than would be
needed to impose civil liability for an act.34 For example, a more direct causal
connection is needed for a person to be convicted in a criminal matter than for
a tort.35
Further, in a civil case, the issues in dispute are private rights between private
litigants. In a criminal case, the government is tasked with balancing the results
of an infringement on societal rules and laws while safeguarding the rights of the
accused in the process.36
The criminal justice system protects broad societal interests
in punishing individuals who violate statutory proscriptions
against violent and otherwise especially deleterious behavior.
The criminal, thus, inflicts an injury on the citizenry as a
whole to be redressed with punitive sanctions, often including
incarceration. Hence, a criminal case goes forward at the

Richard E. Myers, II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law Through
a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1327, 1376–77 (2008) (footnote omitted).
31

32

Id.

33

Mann, supra note 2, at 1811.

34

State v. Uhler, 402 N.E.2d 556, 558 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1979).

“A person legally responsible for his acts in a criminal court will generally be found to be
liable in a civil court for injuries caused by the same criminal actions; however, the reverse is not
always true.” Id.
35

36

Eatherton v. State, 810 P.2d 93, 98 (Wyo. 1991).
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direction of and in the name of the government, and the
individual victims directly harmed cannot call off that
prosecution. Conversely, the civil justice system largely aims to
vindicate individual rights by providing mechanisms to remedy
breaches of contractual arrangements and to award compensation
for commercial wrongs and physical injuries. Civil law is
concerned with compensatory relief, not punishment.37
Civil law protects individuals from being wronged by another. Criminal law
protects society from being wronged. Society can be wronged when a criminal act
harms a third-party, the actor, or society as a whole.38 “Thus, society is not limited
to a minimal protection of property and personal rights.”39 Additionally, “[w]hen
criminal law is used to enforce civil law norms that are aspirational in character
and deliberately soft-edged, the result may distort the civil law.”40
Perhaps most importantly, society may aspire to higher goals with respect to
accepted norms of behavior, and criminal law has a socializing role as a system of
moral education.41 What society concludes, at any given time, is that a socially
acceptable “moral code” drives the enactment and modification of criminal
laws.42 As a result, “[c]riminal law exists to ‘focus censure and blame’ or to
inflict punishment in a manner that maximizes stigma and censure,” without
notion of social utility or pricing that is associated with economic theories of
jurisprudence.43 It cannot be ignored that, at its most basic level, “[l]iability and
sanction, without condemnation and without the sting of punishment” fails to

37
Mashaney v. Bd. of Indigents’ Def. Servs., 313 P.3d 64, 85 (2013), aff ’d in part, rev’d in
part, 355 P.3d 667 (2015); see also Gail Heriot, An Essay on the Civil-Criminal Distinction with
Special Reference to Punitive Damages, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 43, 47 (1996).
38
Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation
Theory of Punishment, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 299, 318 n.69 (1990).
39

Id.

John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—
And What Can Be Done About It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1876 (1992).
40

Ann T. Spence, Note, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include Coercion,
37 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 57, 75 –78 (2003).
41

“[A]ccording to moral education theory, punishment is not intended as a way of
conditioning a human being to do what society wants her to do . . . ; rather, the
theory maintains that punishment is intended as a way of teaching the wrongdoer
that the action she did (or wants to do) is forbidden because it is morally wrong,
and should not be done for that reason.”
Id. at 77 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
42

Id. at 76.

43

Myers, supra note 31, at 1376.
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fulfill the basic human need served by the infliction of deserved punishment,
separate and apart from philosophical principles of right and good.44
The explanatory power of the economic and utilitarian models has been
questioned by those focusing on the moral difference between torts or contracts
and crimes. “Simply put, a crime’s intentional nature makes it morally worse than
the carelessness typified by tortious activity.”45 Thus, the real distinction between
crimes and torts or contracts lies in the moral condemnation of the former but
not the latter.

III. Sexual Assault As Unsuited
To Contract-Based Economic Theories
Economic-based theories of jurisprudence are inherently complicated and
intellectually challenging under any circumstance. They become more so when
an effort is made at a reality-based application of those doctrines to the acts of
criminal sexual assault. This section traces the difficulties presented by any attempt
to apply economic principles to the crime of sexual assault, turning a keen eye
towards notions of consent/assent, capacity, enforceability, and consequences.
Perhaps the biggest difficulty in this academic endeavor has been, and
continues to be, distinguishing consensual sex with sexual assault under the law.46
In an attempt to do so, “many scholars have used a contract analogy.”47 But the
analogy does not necessitate the two concepts be the same.48 Applying contract
law to sexual assault 49 is unworkable in reality and demonstrates “‘mechanical
application of principles’ that are ultimately ‘illogically applied in the area of
forcible sexual invasions.’”50
See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
Rev. 201, 210–12 (1996).
44

45

Bedi, supra note 25, at 559.

46

Spence, supra note 41, at 57–58.

Id. (“It has been noted that ‘[t]he ‘contractual’ nature of sexual relationships is hardly a
novel concept.’”).
47

48
Id. at 58 n.3. Nevertheless, some theorists argue that sex is a contract. See, e.g., Peter D.
Feaver et al., Sex as Contract: Abortion and Expanded Choice, 4 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 211, 213,
218 –19 (1992).

The terms “rape” and “sexual assault” can sometimes be differentiated: Sexual assault covers
a broader spectrum of offenses than rape does, some of which can be non-penetrative. In some
states, the term sexual assault simply has replaced rape, and the terms are used interchangeably.
However, in other states, rape requires use or threat of force whereas sexual assault simply means
any intercourse with no consent. See Myka Held & Juliana McLaughlin, Rape & Sexual Assault, 15
Geo. J. Gender & L. 155, 156 –57 (2014).
49

Carley R. Kranstuber, Comment, Equality Is Not Enough: The Importance of the Due
Process Clause in Redefining Consent to A Sexual Encounter, 45 Cap. U. L. Rev. 765, 787 (2017)
(footnote omitted).
50
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The reality is that contract law and criminal law are not analogous. For
instance, contract law provides remedies to those who suffer breaches of a
contractual promise, and such remedies are designed to make the “victim” whole.51
“[C]riminal law does not have such symmetry.”52 The problem is that “[n]either
rape nor sex can properly be called a contract. There is nothing binding about
sex.”53 Additionally, the well-founded moral standards in criminal law remain a
challenge when creating an analogy between contracts and sexual assault.54 They
occupy different legal domains. And, when the intricacies are considered, the
two are incompatible and incomparable. The economic approaches to law assert
that, on economic grounds, rape should perhaps be legalized (and punished under
contractual doctrines) “if rapists would pay more to rape than victims would pay
to avoid rape.”55 However,
[t]hese examples can make believers in general theories seem
fanatical; indeed, we might understand fanaticism in law and
politics to consist precisely in the insistence on applying general
principles to particular cases in which they produce palpable
absurdity or palpable injustice. The point is not that exponents
of any of these views cannot avoid the seemingly bizarre
counterexample. It is instead that general theories usually do not
make existing convictions about particular cases a constituent
part of the method through which principles are constructed.56
Even Judge Posner, the leading proponent of economic theory, spent
considerable time addressing the particular difficulties presented by any attempt
to apply his principles to the crime of sexual assault:
(2)

Rape. Suppose a rapist derives extra pleasure from the coercive
character of his act. Then there would be (it might seem) no
market substitute for rape, suggesting that rape is not a pure
coercive transfer and should not, on economic grounds,
anyway, be punished criminally. But the argument would
be weak:

Kari Hong, A New Mens Rea for Rape: More Convictions and Less Punishment, 55 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 259, 324 (2018).
51

52

Id.

53

Spence, supra note 41, at 75 (footnotes omitted).

54

Id. at 75–78.

Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 749–50
(1993) (footnote omitted).
55

56

Id. at 750 (footnotes omitted).
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Because there are heavy penalties for rape, the rapes that
take place—that have not been deterred—may indeed be
weighted toward a form of rape for which there are no
consensual substitutes; it does not follow that the rape
that is deterred is generally of this character.

(b)

Put differently, the prohibition against rape is to the
marriage and sex “market” as the prohibition against
theft is to explicit markets in goods and services.

(c)

Given the economist’s definition of “value,” even if the
rapist cannot find a consensual substitute (and one such
substitute, prostitution, is itself illegal), it does not follow
that he values the rape more than the victim disvalues
it. There is a difference between a coerced transaction that
has no consensual substitute and one necessary to overcome
the costs of consensual transactions; only the second can
create wealth, and therefore be efficient. Indeed, what the
argument boils down to is that some rape is motivated
in part or whole by the negative interdependence of the
parties’ utilities, and this, as I have argued in connection
with crimes of passion, is no reason for considering the
act efficient.

(d)

As with my earlier discussion of crimes of passion, it
is important not to take too narrow a view of market
alternatives. Supposing it to be true that some rapists
would not get as much pleasure from consensual sex,
it does not follow that there are no other avenues of
satisfaction open to them. It may be that instead of
furtively stalking women they can obtain satisfactions
from productive activities, that is, activities in which
other people are compensated and thus derive benefits.
This is an additional reason to think that the total wealth
of society would be increased if rape could be completely
repressed at a reasonable cost.

487

All this may seem to be a hopelessly labored elucidation of the
obvious, that rape is a bad thing; but I think it useful to point out
that economic analysis need not break down in the face of such
apparently noneconomic phenomena as rape.57

Posner, supra note 28, at 1198 –99 (emphasis added). See also Jason Scott Johnston, Law,
Economic, and Post-Realist Explanation, 24 Law & Soc’y Rev. 1217, 1241–42 (1990).
57
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Judge Posner recognized the challenges in applying contract-based legal
theories to sexual assault in that there are no market alternatives and no
consensual substitutes for sexual assault. Suffice to say, sexual assault is a
crime that the utilitarian or economic theories of jurisprudence simply cannot
reconcile. Because sexual assault, like other violent crimes, involves more than
a balancing of economies, such as the consideration of the emotional impacts
of the acts, the notion of the social benefit is necessarily lost. That is so because
economic models are reliant on the law’s fiction of “the reasonable man.” No
such creature has ever existed. To pretend that an economic model “works” by
reference to this nonexistent creature is to ignore very real and human reactions to
violent crimes. Logic does not always prevail; mankind does not make decisions
to commit crimes such as sexual assault based on a rational assessment of the
situation, nor does mankind temper a reaction to violent crimes through the lens
of logic. Certainly, such fictional constructs are necessary tools in understanding
how things should work, even if that is not how things do work. “Seen as a prism
through which to view human interaction, homo œconomicus is a useful guide to
prediction. Useful, as long as we acknowledge that the construct is fictional.”58
That disconnect is even more apparent when looking at the elements of sexual
assault vis-à-vis contract law in more detail.

B. Consent to Sexual Intercourse Versus Contractual Assent
Recognizing that the economic and utilitarian legal theories work only in
theory, it remains appropriate to demonstrate how the act of sexual assault is
particularly contrary to the application of contract law principles.

1. Defining Consent Versus Assent
“Consent is a critical concept for law. Private law often rests upon the ability
of people to create binding changes of legal status, rights, and obligations.”59
Whether in the context of contract formation or contractual interpretation,
courts utilize an objective approach, considering “what a reasonable man in the
position of the other party would conclude his manifestations to mean.”60

58

Rachlin, supra note 13, at 22. “Homo œconomicus” means:
Economic man, or the rational agent depicted in economic models. Such an agent
has consistent and stable preferences; he is entirely forward-looking, and pursues
only his own self-interest. When given options he chooses the alternative with
the highest expected utility for himself. It is controversial whether this figure is
realistic, and if not, how much that matters to economic theory.

Homo economicus, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (2d ed. 2008).
59
Jennifer A. Drobac & Oliver R. Goodenough, Exposing the Myth of Consent, 12 Ind.
Health L. Rev. 471, 472 (2015) (emphasis omitted).

Roussalis v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 231 (Wyo. 2000) (citation omitted); see also
Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 16, 75 P.3d 640, 649 (Wyo. 2003).
60
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While it is essential that the mutual assent of the parties to the
terms of a contract must be sufficiently definite to enable the
court to ascertain what they are, nevertheless it is not necessary
that each term be spelled out in minute detail. It is only that
the essentials of the contract must have been agreed upon and
be ascertainable. * * * The law does not favor the destruction of
contracts on the ground of indefiniteness, and if it be feasible the
court will so construe the agreement so as to carry into effect the
reasonable intention of the parties if that can be ascertained.61
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19 (1979) provides guidance in
determining whether a contract exists, specifically with respect to the element
of assent:
(1)

The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by
written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act.

(2)

The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his
assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows
or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his
conduct that he assents.

(3)

The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though
he does not in fact assent. In such cases a resulting contract
may be voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or other
invalidating cause.62

Once there is a manifestation of assent to a valid offer, a binding contract is
formed, assuming all other contractual requirements are in place.63
In comparison, consent to sexual intercourse is a “philosophical, psycholog
ical, and legal quagmire[.]”64 Consensual sex has many definitions, seemingly
synonymous in nature, such as sex that is desired, wanted, willing, or agreed-to.
However, each definition may carry a vastly different interpretation, given the
particular context in which it is used.65 When defining consent as cooperation,
some laws give the impression that the idea of acquiescence equates to consent

61

Roussalis, 4 P.3d at 231 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

62

Birt, ¶ 16, 75 P.3d at 649.

63

17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 32.

64

Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 415, 421 (2016).

65

Id. at 423–24 (footnote omitted).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1

490

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

throughout the entire sexual encounter.66 Yet, “[c]onsent is an affirmative
decision to engage in a sexual encounter, and both participants must be responsive
and involved if either’s actions or words are to be considered as consent.”67
Unlike the objective theory of contracts, the more pressing definitional
question is whether sexual consent is a mental state, an external performance, or
both. When an actor’s spoken words and manifested acts correspond to his or her
internal state-of-mind, there is no real debate about consent, or lack thereof. On
the other hand, a debate arises when the two do not coincide with one approach
requiring a “consent transaction,” involving both a sufficient internal mental state
and external performance of that state.68
In addition to the expressive and attitudinal varieties of consent, there is also
the second approach: legal consent. There is a substantial difference between a
factual acquiescence, oftentimes via expressive or attitudinal affirmation, and what
the law requires an individual to do under the circumstances.69 Legal consent to
an act exists when one does or experiences anything under such conditions as the
jurisdiction would deem sufficient for one’s conduct or experience to constitute
consent.70 Because of the potential difference between actual consent and what
is only interpreted to be legal consent, the law of consent as applied to sexual
intercourse is anything but clear. “However, consent theory and social contracts
fail to distinguish consent from habitual acquiescence, assent, silent dissent,
submission, or even forced admission, all of which are recognized as legal forms
of consent.”71
In sum, the notions of contractual assent and consent to sexual relations are
unique in nature and based on entirely different values. Courts and scholars,
influenced by economic analysis, tend to conceive of any given social problem
as a problem in efficiency.72 Economists define efficiency in two ways. First,
under the Kaldor-Hicks approach, an efficient allocation of resources may be
defined as one in which their value is maximized, with “value” being measured
by how much an individual is willing to pay.73 Second, under the Pareto model,

66
Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: “No” Means “No,” but What Does “Yes”
Mean?, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2341, 2350–51 (2004).
67

Id. at 2350.

68

Gruber, supra note 64, at 423–24.

69

Kranstuber, supra note 50, at 786.

70

Id.

71

Id. (footnote omitted).

Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable
517, 517 (1995).
72

73

This method emphasizes the aggregate of values in society rather than their distribution. Id.

at 524.
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an allocation is efficient when it results from the exchange of resources in a
voluntary, informed transaction.74 Here, the Pareto philosophy relies upon two
premises: (1) that individuals are always the best judges of their own utility; and
(2) that interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible in the absence of
exchange.75 Also, under the Pareto model, an “exchange” is not a valid indicator of
consent unless it is completely voluntary and has no effects on anyone external to
the exchange.76
It does not require a significant stretch of the imagination to conclude that
these theories may work in theory—but they present an unrealistic dynamic.
They require a buy-in belief of “pure” consent by an individual who is absolutely
capable of making the best decision for his or her well-being at any given
moment.77 Decisions that are not the product of voluntary agreement will most
likely generate “winners and losers.” Because it is difficult to measure the impacts
of those decisions on the affected individuals, it is hard to determine if there is any
net improvement in social welfare, much less on a personal level for the “loser.”78
Thus, when we apply economic principles and
[w]hen we elevate consent arguments to the level of social
choice, the claim is not that each individual loser consents to
his particular losses, but rather that individuals conceived of in
a certain way—rational, with a particular attitude toward risk
and a moral sense—would choose to apply the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion. The individual losses that result from Kaldor-Hicks
improvements would be justified because losers and winners
consented ex ante to pursue policies with the risk that some
would come out on the short end. The justification of particular
losses is a matter of fairness, not consent. The principle of
consent would apply to the justification of the institutions, the
principle of fairness to individual losses.79
Stated another way, society, as a whole, may determine what behavior
equates to consent—recognizing that, in any given situation, the result might
be significant individual loss (sexual assault), but that the individual loss can

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

Pure consent represents the notion that no individual is influenced by internal or external
factors that negatively or inappropriately affect decision-making that is in one’s own best interests.
See David S. Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 2143, 2150 (1986).
77

78

Estin, supra note 72, at 524.

Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard
Posner’s the Economics of Justice, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1127 (1982).
79
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be forgiven because society deemed that it would be so. What that does is
pit individuals against each other for the sake of “societal goodness” with the
individual’s fingers crossed that he or she will not be the recipient of the loss.
In theory, this approach may have merit; in reality, it leaves the loser with
no recourse.

2. The Timing and Revocability of Consent/Assent
An argument can be made that consent to sexual intercourse must be
contemporaneous to the physical act. Put another way, consent cannot and
should not “be inferred from past consent or an existing sexual relationship.”80
To apply contractual principles to sexual assault scenarios would be to say that
past intimacy or relationship status is indicative of present consent.81 Further,
the traditional view of sexual assault is that the act of penetration completes
the offense.82 Thus a lack of consent, or the withdrawal of consent, must occur
before penetration. Stated otherwise, for sexual intercourse to be considered
consensual, consent must precede penetration.83 But it must be clear that in the
context of sexual intercourse, as opposed to a contractual transaction, consent can
be withdrawn at any time.84
The idea of consent as ongoing cooperation suggests that
lack of consent is the absence of that cooperation (passivity,

80

Gruber, supra note 64, at 437.

81

Id.

82

Note, supra note 66, at 2348.
The traditional view of rape is that the act of penetration completes the offense;
therefore, the elements establishing an act of sexual intercourse as rape—lack of
consent and use of force—must occur before the act of penetration. A number
of current statutory definitions of “sexual intercourse” support this idea. Under
these statutes, penetration becomes the critical moment—the defining moment—
of rape, thereby bifurcating rape into acts that occur prior to penetration and
acts that occur after penetration. This means that for sexual intercourse to be
considered consensual, consent must precede penetration. Conversely, consent
that has been granted must be withdrawn prior to penetration. This seemingly
straightforward position is complicated by the fact that courts regard verbal
statements and nonverbal behavior—specifically, acts of intimacy—as expressions
of consent. Clearly, the statement “let’s have sex” or “I want to have sex with you”
indicates consent to intercourse. And this consent can be withdrawn—according
to the traditional view—at any time prior to penetration. However, to the extent
that the case law also infers consent to intercourse from a person’s willingness to
engage in sexually intimate acts prior to intercourse, the law effectively requires a
revocation of consent to intercourse in situations in which consent may not have
been granted.

Id. at 2348 –50.
83

Id. at 2348.

84

Id. at 2349.
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acquiescence) rather than an affirmative revocation of consent.
This suggestion indicates that revocation of consent is not
required. Although practically, some expression of nonconsent
would be necessary to indicate lack of interest in further sexual
intimacy on a particular occasion, at the very least, “consent as
cooperation” rejects the idea that this expression of nonconsent
is the revocation of previously granted consent to intercourse.85
On the other hand, it is well-established that the time of the acceptance in
a contractual setting results in a binding contract.86 Further, once contractual
assent is communicated, it is binding and the parties have a legally enforceable
contract (assuming all other elements are met). The parties can contract for future
performance, not just contemporaneous conduct.87 If either the offeror or the
offeree were to withdraw from the established contract at that point, consequences
would ensue. This mutual assent is a critical component of contract law:
When assent is ambiguous, there usually is no contract. One
purpose for requiring such assent is to ensure respect for the
autonomy of the parties to the contract; imposing terms on
people to which they did not explicitly agree can be perceived
as paternalism. In contrast, rape law has placed the burden of
ambiguity on the silent party, and thus silence has meant assent
to sex. Ironically, some defend this status quo in rape law because
they believe that placing the burden on women to expressly
decline sex defends their right to sexual autonomy.88
Applying notions of contractual assent to consent in sexual assault may
equate past consent with acceptance of future sexual acts and allow past consent to
stand in times of future diminished capacity. A hypothetical is more illustrative:
S seeks novel forms of intimacy with her husband A and
challenges A to see if he can have intercourse with her while
she is sleeping. In this scenario, A would have a defense to
charges of sexual assault based on S’s prospective consent, even

85

Id. at 2350.

86

2 Williston on Contracts § 6:61 (4th ed. 2018) (time of formation of contract).

Thomas D. Barton, Improving Contracts Through Expanding Perspectives of Understanding,
52 Cal. W. L. Rev. 33, 37 n.7 (2015) (“A promise about future conduct is what distinguishes a
contract from an immediate sale or service transaction.”).
87

Katharine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 Harv. J. L. & Gender 447,
451 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
88
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though A’s conduct occurred at a time when S was incapable of
contemporaneous consent.89
This theory has already been debunked in the context of consent (or lack
thereof ) to medical treatment: “A patient’s consent to the collection of his or
her blood for laboratory testing does not connote consent to donate blood. Nor
does past consent imply present or future consent.”90 Why, then, would other
encounters, especially those involving sexual intercourse be any different? Just
because a person chose to consent to sex before does not make that person “even
marginally more likely to consent to additional sexual affairs.”91 In that way,
even viewed under the lens of contract law, every sexual encounter is a distinct
contract, entirely unrelated to any prior or subsequent contracts. Logic dictates
the sound conclusion that contract-based notions of custom, industry practice,
and the “norm” simply do not apply to sexual intercourse. Further, in considering
the existence of consent, it necessarily follows that one must have the ability to
consent to the contract, or conduct, at issue.

C. Contractual Capacity
To form a contract, both parties thereto must have the capacity to contract.92
A contracting party is competent if, at the time of executing the agreement, he
or she has sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the transaction
and agrees to its provisions. All persons are presumed to have the capacity to
contract.93 Recognizing the contrary, under the common law, a contract is void if
a party lacks the requisite mental capacity at the time of contracting.94 Generally
speaking, a person who manifests assent to a transaction has full legal capacity
to incur contractual duties unless he or she is a minor (infant), intoxicated, or
mentally incompetent.95

1. Minors
In People v. Tobias, the California Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether a minor who “consents” to an incestuous relationship constitutes an

89
Jonathan Witmer-Rich, It’s Good to Be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, Retrospective
Consent, and the Foundation of Consent in the Criminal Law, 5 Crim. L. & Phil. 377, 384–85
(2011) (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).
90

People v. Lee, 93 N.E.3d 512, 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (Hyman, J., specially concurring).

Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and A
New Rape Shield Law, 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 51, 89 (2002) (footnote omitted).
91

92

17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 27.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.
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accomplice to the crime.96 The court held that a minor who engages in a “sexual
relationship with an adult is a victim, not a perpetrator,” regardless of the child’s
consent.97 Because minors are unable to legally consent to sexual intercourse, they
cannot be criminally liable for incest.98 Indeed, statutory rape laws are premised
on the idea that a minor, due solely to the minor’s age, cannot legally consent to
sexual intercourse under any circumstances.99
Yet, an application of contract theory to criminal sexual assault cases can
undermine this notion by equating adolescent assent with adolescent consent.100
Adolescent assent in the medical context requires an associated parental consent,
while the same is not required in a sexual relationship.101 Similarly, adolescent
assent does not require a “threshold level of capacity” that is required in consent.102
“Similar to consent by a minor under contract law, assent is voidable by
the minor.”103
Still, carving a distinct difference between capacity of a minor to contract
and to consent to sexual intercourse may well be appropriate. Recognizing a
minor’s capacity to consent to sexual intercourse suggests that, by having sexual
experience, the minor becomes less vulnerable to coercion, and in essence, gains
the capacity to consent to sex.104 While the argument may have some value in
theory, it is an area that requires case-by-case assessment on an individualized
level. “An infant is often mentally competent in fact to understand the force

96

21 P.3d 758, 759 (Cal. 2001).

97

Id.

98

Id. at 767.

Erin K. Jackson, Addressing the Inconsistency Between Statutory Rape Laws and Underage
Marriage: Abolishing Early Marriage and Removing the Spousal Exemption to Statutory Rape, 85
UMKC L. Rev. 343, 345 (2017).
99

100
Jennifer Ann Drobac, Wake Up and Smell the Starbucks Coffee: How Doe v. Starbucks
Confirms the End of “The Age of Consent” in California and Perhaps Beyond, 33 B.C. J. L. & Soc.
Just. 1, 41– 43 (2013).

Drobac, supra note 100, at 41– 42; see also Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla.
1994); Jackson, supra note 99, at 345. Adolescent assent recognizes that children, ages thirteen
through seventeen, are often able to form opinions and make decisions that are either beneficial or
detrimental, depending on the context. The development of this notion suggests that adolescents
should be consulted and permitted to voice their opinions. Adolescent assent arises in many
contexts, from assent to medical research and participation in medical studies to engagement in
mutual sexual relations. See Christine Grady et al., Assent in Research: The Voices of Adolescents, 54 J.
Adolescent Health 515 (2014).
101

102
Drobac, supra note 100, at 41– 42; see also Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1089; (Fla. 1994); Jackson,
supra note 99, at 345.
103
Drobac, supra note 100, at 41– 42; see also Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1089; (Fla. 1994); Jackson,
supra note 99, at 345.

Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law,
85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 15, 35 (1994).
104
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of her bargain, but it is the policy of the law to protect the minor.”105 Thus,
an application of contract law ignores the unique nature of sexual assault,
wherein society is called upon to harmonize mutually exclusive goals of
protecting individuals against private oppression (the sexual assault) versus state
oppression (restricting personal autonomy and the ability to make decisions
regarding sexual activities).106

2. Intoxicated Individuals
In contract law, capacity is a requirement of every valid contract, and
intoxication may negate the existence of capacity, and thus the existence of a valid
contract. “A completely intoxicated person is generally placed on the same footing
with persons of unsound mind.”107 When intoxication renders one incapable of
consent, that individual lacks capacity to contract.108
The rule of law applicable to such cases is thoroughly established. It is not every case of drunkenness that will defeat
a contract executed by an intoxicated man. A completely
intoxicated person is generally placed upon the same footing
as persons of unsound mind, since one deprived of reason and
understanding by drunkenness is, for the time, as unable to
consent to the terms of a contract as a person who lacks mental
capacity by reason of insanity or idiocy. There is, however, a
marked distinction between cases of complete intoxication and
cases of partial intoxication. A person who at the time of making
a contract is completely intoxicated may avoid the contract
notwithstanding the fact that his intoxicated condition may
have been caused by his voluntary act and not by the contrivance
of a party to the contract. But to permit a person only partially
intoxicated to avoid his contract would enable one to make
drunkenness a cloak for fraud, since a party may be partially
intoxicated without being completely incapacitated to contract;
and this fact has impelled the courts to define the degree of
intoxication which will be a ground for avoiding a contract. The
degree of intoxication necessary to avoid a contract has been

5 Williston on Contracts § 10:3 (4th ed. 2018). Society has determined that, given the
chance that a minor is incapable of consent, a bright-line rule applies: Minors cannot consent. This
rule protects both minors and adults by establishing clear expectations, as opposed to requiring
individuals to determine a minor’s ability to consent on a case-by-case, child-by-child basis. Id.
105

106

Oberman, supra note 104, at 34–36.

107

Intoxication as ground for avoiding contract, 36 A.L.R. 619 art. I (2019).

108

Id.
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variously stated by the courts, but there is little difference in
their conclusions.109
Similarly, consent to sex becomes an issue when the parties are intoxicated.
And in the context of sexual assault this consideration must be viewed both in
terms of intoxication of the perpetrator and of the victim. Intoxication can affect
an ability to consent; likewise, it can affect an ability to interpret lack of consent.
“[A] severely intoxicated man may be honestly mistaken as to a woman’s consent
to engage in sex[.]”110 That intoxicated man “assumes the risk of liability for
conduct that he would not have engaged in if sober, which includes the risk of
committing rape-by-intoxication.”111
The difficulty is, and always has been, evaluating the level of intoxication
and its effect on the intoxicated party. “The level of incapacity at the time of the
encounter may be difficult to assess because the incapacitating condition wears off,
often before incapacity can be evaluated.”112 Also concerning is the fact that many
rape-by-intoxication cases occur as a result of voluntary or mutual intoxication,
which can serve to the disadvantage of either or both parties.113
Scholars have struggled with how to deal with these issues. But, one cannot
assert that, by simply avoiding intoxication, which may have prevented the sexual
assault, the victim is responsible for the sexual assault.114 Contrast that conclusion
with one posited by the economic theorists as follows:
the fact that women frequently become intoxicated voluntarily
and have sex shows that a nontrivial percentage of them must
value intoxicated sex . . . . [T]he effects of alcohol on capacity
are sufficiently well known that many of these women must
realize when they decide to become intoxicated that they will
make intoxicated decisions about sex that they might not have
made if sober. Accordingly, . . . we should regard the consent
of the voluntarily intoxicated as effective . . . . [I]f the harm of
unwanted sex is great enough, then that would be a reason to
adopt a different rule even if the vast majority of intoxicated

109

Glenn v. Martin, 200 S.W. 456, 456 –57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1918) (citations omitted).

Valerie M. Ryan, Comment, Intoxicating Encounters: Allocating Responsibility in the Law of
Rape, 40 Cal. W. L. Rev. 407, 427 (2004).
110

111

Id.

Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 1201, 1219 n.95
(2015) (citation omitted).
112

113

Id. (citation omitted).

114

Ryan, supra note 110, at 426.
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sex is desired ex ante. But in most cases, the consequences of
sex are fleeting—unlike getting a tattoo, which . . . may require
contemporaneous sober consent.115
In sum, the suggestion is that unwanted sexual intercourse subjected to as a
result of voluntary intoxication is less traumatic than a permanent tattoo. That
theory may suffice under contract law where the contract can be rescinded, but
it fails under criminal law because, once completed, sexual intercourse cannot
be revoked.

3. Incompetent Individuals
Again, in the realm of capacity, a contract executed by an incompetent
individual is either void or voidable, depending upon the circumstances.116
[M]ental weakness alone is generally not sufficient to justify
setting aside a contract; rather, the test is whether, at the time of
the transaction, the alleged incompetent party was so deprived
of her mental faculties as to be wholly unable to understand
or comprehend the nature and consequences of the transaction
(the majority cognitive test); or, under the Restatement Second
formulation, whether the alleged incompetent is unable to act
in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the
other party has reason to know of her condition (the minority
affective test).117
Contractual capacity is assessed at the moment of the execution of a legal
instrument.118 Applying notions of incompetence to sexual relations is exceedingly
difficult under notions of personal autonomy and entirely unique of contractbased considerations:
While most researchers agree that at least a portion of the mildly
[mentally incompetent] population is able to give informed
sexual consent, some professionals within the [intellectual
disability] field disagree over whether severely or even profoundly
[intellectually disabled] individuals can always be deemed
incompetent. On the one hand, a general study concerning the
ability of [intellectually disabled] individuals to consent in a

115
Kevin Cole, Sex and the Single Malt Girl: How Voluntary Intoxication Affects Consent, 78
Mont. L. Rev. 155, 163 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
116

5 Williston on Contracts § 10:3.

117

Id. (footnote omitted).

118

Id.
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number of areas besides sex, such as the capacity to consent to
surgery, found that those with moderate [intellectual disabilities]
were seldom judged to be capable, regardless of the consent issue
involved . . . . On the other hand, some researchers caution that
“to ask a severely or profoundly [intellectually disabled] person
to identify and appreciate the subtle distinctions [between sexual
expression and abuse] is simply asking too much.”119
“Consent to a sexual act requires the exercise of intelligence based upon
knowledge of the consequences, significance, and moral quality of the act.”120
Mental incompetence can result in a blurring of the understanding of the choice
between assent to the sexual act and resistance to it.121 Apart from cold contractbased considerations, it is appropriate to also consider society’s measure of the
moral quality of a sexual act, “and thus, assess the victim’s ability to appreciate
that fact; the victim’s personal moral behavior or sense of values, however, is
not to enter into the equation as distinct from an awareness of the prevailing
moral code.”122
Accordingly, application of contractual capacity encompasses not only
notions of an individual’s pure ability to consent to the act but, when viewed
through the lens of criminal law, also considers society’s moral compass.

D. Contractual Concepts of Fraud, Duress, and Undue Influence:
Unnecessary in the Modern Criminal Sexual Assault Context
Proponents of the contract-sexual assault comparison have argued that
contract principles of duress, unconscionability, undue influence, and other
contract principles can and should be applied to criminal sexual assault.123

1. Fraud
The concept behind the defense of fraud is that the defrauded party has not
assented to the agreement since the fraudulent conduct precludes the requisite
mutual assent.124 “Fraudulent inducement is an elementary concept in the law of

Elizabeth J. Reed, Note, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Persons to
Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 Va. L. Rev. 799, 820 (1997) (alterations added to correct dated and
potentially offensive language).
119

120

35A N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law: Principles and Offenses § 599.

121

Id. (footnote omitted).

122

Id. (footnote omitted).

123

Spence, supra note 41, at 58–59.

Megan R. Comport, Comment, Enforcing Contractual Waivers of a Claim for Fraud in the
Inducement, 37 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1031, 1031 (1997).
124
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contracts and is intended to shield a party from liability in a contract action only
when another party has procured the alleged contract wrongfully.”125

2. Duress
The word duress is both vague and ambiguous. Duress is vague because,
although courts generally agree upon its meaning at its core, its meaning blurs at
the edges. The term is ambiguous because it is subject to more than one meaning.
One court, quoting the original Restatement of Contracts, defined duress as:
(a)

any wrongful act of one person that compels a manifestation
of apparent assent by another to a transaction without his
volition, or

(b)

any wrongful threat of one person by words or other conduct
that induces another to enter into a transaction under the
influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will
and judgment, if the threat was intended or should reasonably
have been expected to operate as an inducement.126

Duress is essentially a defect in the contract formation process, which
ultimately results in that contract being unenforceable.127 Traditionally, duress
required an illegal threat, which often manifested in the form of threatening
physical harm, physical injury, or the wrongful withholding of goods.128 Under
modern contract principles, the threat does not need to be illegal, but can instead
be one that is simply improper.129 Ultimately the duress doctrine can be viewed
as containing three aspects: the coercer’s illegitimate behavior, the absence of free
will of the aggrieved party, and the unfairness of the contract.130 When all three
are present, a contract may not be enforceable by the innocent party.

3. Undue Influence
Finally, the defense of undue influence can be implicated when a power
imbalance exists between the contracting parties, either because of an unfair and
dominating persuasion employed by one party against the other or because the

125

26 Williston on Contracts § 69:1 (4th ed. 2018) (footnote omitted).

126

28 id. § 71:4 (footnote omitted) (defining duress).

127

Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari & Perillo on Contracts § 9.2 (5th ed. 2003).

Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 Harv. J. L. & Gender 171,
178 (2013).
128

129

Id.

130

Id. at 177– 85.
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parties’ pre-contractual relationship leads the victim to assume that the other
“will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare.”131 Consequentially,
[i]f a party in whom another reposes confidence misuses that
confidence to gain an advantage while the other has been
made to feel that the party in question will not act against its
welfare, the transaction is the result of undue influence. The
influence must be such that the victim acts in a way contrary
to its own best interest and thus in a fashion in which it
would not have operated but for the undue influence. Undue
influence is equivalent to that which constrains the will or
destroys the free agency of the person and substitutes in its place
the will of another.132
Supplementary support in comprehending how undue influence is applied can
be found in the commentary to the Second Restatement, which specifies factors
that should be considered in applying the notion.133 These factors include “the
unfairness of the resulting bargain, the unavailability of independent advice, and
the susceptibility of the person persuaded.”134

4. Effects on Enforceability
Of course, in the contractual context, fraud, duress, mistake, or an
unconscionable bargain will vitiate a contract.135 Thus, if fraud, duress, or undue
influence are found, the contract is void or voidable.136 That conclusion logically
follows given that, when looking to whether contracts should be enforced and
parties protected, one must look to whether the parties acted voluntarily or
fully informed, and whether the bargaining process was fair.137 In order to avoid
fraudulently created contracts, traditionally, a party was not bound when he
did not act voluntarily, when he was tricked into assenting, or when his assent

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177 (Am. Law Inst. 2019). The precise definition
is as follows: “unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of the person exercising the
persuasion or who by virtue of the relation between them is justified in assuming that that person
will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare.” Id.
131

132

28 Williston on Contracts § 71:50 (footnotes omitted).

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177 cmt. b. The comment goes on to say that
these factors alone are not controlling. Id.
133

134

Id.

Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 740 (Wyo. 2001); State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 145
(Iowa 2011).
135

136

See 26 Williston on Contracts § 69:4 (effect of fraud as rendering transaction voidable

or void).
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circum
stances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1413, 1415 –16 (2009).
137
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was unfairly procured.138 “One induced to enter into a transaction by undue
influence or duress has the same power of avoidance and the same remedies and
defenses that one has in the case of fraud or mistake.”139 As a result, fraud in
the inducement, or creation, of the contract renders any apparent assent to the
agreement nonexistent.140
The court may refuse the discretionary relief of specific perfor
mance on account of undue influence or duress even though
the requisites for the affirmative remedies of reformation or of
rescission are not present.
So, too, equity will grant appropriate relief by way of a
decree for cancellation, or to vacate a conveyance, transfer, or
satisfaction of judgment and the like which has been procured
by undue influence or duress.141
The academics seeking to extend these doctrines to apply them to situations
of nonconsensual sexual intercourse rely, at times, on the belief that they assist in
refining the definition of force to include emotional and psychological factors,
aiding in understanding whether there has been an equal agreement to sexual
relations, and providing a guide for conceptualizing the important freedom of
each individual to consent to sexual intercourse.142

5. The Legal Response to an Imperfect Criminal Law Approach to “Rape”
This belief was understandable, even laudable, during a time when sexual
intercourse was not considered sexual assault without proof of force, actual or
constructive, evidenced by words or conduct of the defendant. This was “so even
though the intercourse may have occurred without the actual consent and against
the actual will of the alleged victim.”143 Under the traditional definition of the

138
Hao Jiang, Freedom to Mislead: The Fictitious Freedom to Contract Around Fraud Under
Delaware Law, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 393, 397 (2017).
139

28 Williston on Contracts § 71:62 (footnote omitted).

Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 Yale
L.J. 1372, 1399 n.136 (2013).
140

141

28 Williston on Contracts § 71:62 (footnotes omitted).

State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 145 (Iowa 2011); see also James T. McHugh, Inter
preting the “Sexual Contract” in Pennsylvania: The Motivations and Legacy of Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Robert A. Berkowitz, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 1677, 1686 (1997); Spence, supra note 41, at
57; Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L.J. 1087, 1120 (1986).
142

143
Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213, 1219-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). But see Janet E.
Findlater, Reexamining the Law of Rape, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1356, 1360 (1988). “What sense can
one make of this paradox: The victim was not forced to have sexual intercourse, but she had sexual
intercourse against her will and without her consent?” Id. (commenting on Goldberg).
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crime of rape, making no express provision for rape-by-fraud or impersonation,
fraud did not vitiate or retract consent or supply the requisite force.144
For more than a century, courts, legislatures, and legal
commentators struggled with the question of whether sexual
assault could occur without the use of force; in other words, by
and through the use of fraud, duress, undue influence, or other
deception. In 1986, Professor Susan Estrich suggested that rape
law should “prohibit fraud to secure sex to the same extent we
prohibit fraud to secure money, and prohibit extortion to secure
sex to the same extent we prohibit extortion to secure money.”145
But times, indeed, have changed. Legislatures, legal commentators, and courts
now recognize that sexual assault may occur even without the application (or
threat) of physical force.146 In response to decades of calls for reform, legislatures
have been enacting a comprehensive array of criminal statutes outlawing multiple
forms of sexual offenses committed by fraudulent or coercive means.147 Courts,
too, have come to recognize that:
The outrage upon the [victim], and the injury to society, is just
as great in these cases as if actual force had been employed; and
[courts] have been unable to satisfy ourselves that the act can be
said to be any less against the will of the [victim] when [his or]
her consent is obtained by fraud, than when it is extorted by
threats or force.148
Though perhaps slower than some may desire, the system worked as intended. As
society came to understand that nonconsensual intercourse (e.g., rape or sexual
assault) could be realized in a variety of settings, the laws changed in response.149
Earlier movements changed two of the historical elements of rape: sexual
intercourse (limited to vaginal penetration) and a female victim not married to the

144
Rape by fraud or impersonation, 91 A.L.R. 2d 591 art. II, § 4 (2019); see Don Moran v.
People, 25 Mich. 356 (1872) (holding that rape by fraud or impersonation might be a punishable
crime, were it not for the words “by force,” or “forcibly” contained in the applicable definition
of rape, statutory or otherwise; see also People v. Bartow, 1 Wheeler Cr. 378 (N.Y. 1823); Walter
v. People, 50 Barb. 144 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1867); R v. Williams, (1923) 1 KB 340 (Eng.); State v.
Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
145
Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 39, 44–45 (1998)
(footnotes omitted) (citing Susan Estrich, supra note 142, at 1120 (1986)); see also id. 44–45 n.3–7.
146

See generally id. at 44– 45.

147

Id. at 91.

Id. at 44, 44 n.2 (citing People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427, 437 (1865)); see also Pomeroy
v. State, 94 Ind. 96, 102 (1883) (quoting Crosswell ).
148

149

Falk, supra note 145, at 45.
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defendant.150 The trend continued with statutory changes recognizing multiple
forms of sexual penetration and contact, gender-neutral language to cover
perpetrators and victims, and elimination of the marital exemption.151 Finally,
reform mandated even more extensive changes, such as amendments to resistance
and corroboration requirements, rape shield laws, reformation of suspicionengendering jury instructions, and changes in the terms used to describe sexual
crimes (e.g., references to sexual assault rather than rape).152
While the changes may not be perfect, or even complete, the appropriate
response is not the adoption and application of civil contract law. Rather, if
needed, legislatures should replace the independent crime of sexual assault with
a variety of statutory offenses that would more clearly and more justly define
criminal liability for culpable conduct aimed at causing other individuals to
engage in sexual acts.153 Indeed, many states have already done so.154 Every state
has at least one relevant criminal provision, and many have civil statutes and
disciplinary rules covering similar behavior, although these are beyond the scope
of the present analysis.155
Now, generally speaking, five categories of crimes address such matters:
(1) those who abuse positions of trust; (2) those who abuse positions of authority
to secure sexual compliance; (3) crimes that specifically outlaw the use of fraud
or deception; (4) crimes that substitute coercion and other types of nonphysical
pressures for the force requirement; and (5) crimes that prohibit nonconsensual
intercourse without reference to force, fraud, or coercion.156 These new statutory
enactments cluster around five organizational themes that outlaw sexual
penetration or contact accomplished by abuse of trust, abuse of authority, fraud,
coercion, and nonconsent.
The first category, abuse of trust, carves out for special treatment defined
groups of potential offenders who abuse positions of trust and have access to
vulnerable victims (e.g., medical personnel). The second category prohibits
sexual conduct when the criminal actor abuses a position of authority over a
victim (e.g., a prison guard). The third group specifically outlaws the use of fraud
or deception in securing sexual compliance, such as disguising one’s appearance
to trick the victim into believing the intercourse was with another. The fourth

150

Id. at 90.

151

Id.

152

Id. at 90 –91.

Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and
the Absence of Consent, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1780, 1780 (1992).
153

154

Id. at 1783.

155

Falk, supra note 145, at 89 n.265 (detailing numerous statutory schemes of various states).

156

Id. at 47.
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substitutes coercion or other types of nonphysical pressure for the traditional
requirement of physical force, as may occur in situations of verbal threats or
extortion. Finally, the fifth class simply punishes nonconsensual intercourse
without reference to force, fraud, or coercion.157
This fifth and final approach is preferable to that of a blind application
of contract law that fails to recognize the nuances of the act of sexual assault.
More specifically, an economic theorist may assert that obtaining intercourse by
impersonation or fraud lays the foundation for a defense to statutory rape in
that the adult-defendant may assert a contract-based defense of “fraud” on his
contention of an honest and reasonable mistake-of-age, particularly given any
efforts by the juvenile-victim to appear “of age.”158 This defense goes beyond
the statutory provisions that already appropriately address notions of mistakeof-age.159 What becomes apparent is that contract law principles may have
unintended consequences, meaning now the perpetrator of the sexual assault (the
of-age individual) may be entitled to wage a civil lawsuit against the under-age
victim based on the minor’s “deceitful appearance” as being of the age of majority.
The result turns the notion of sexual assault on its head.

E. Damages for Breach of Contract or Withdrawal of Consent?
Harkening back to the basics of the economic theory of jurisprudence,
one must realize that wealth maximization is at the theory’s core. In fact, law
and economics scholars present the wealth maximization theory (WMT) as an
alternative system “that promises to solve many of [society’s] problems.”160 By
defining wealth as “the value in dollars or dollar equivalents . . . of everything
in society,” WMT claims to solve a historical inability to measure, compare,
and maximize utility.161 Under this economic approach, “by cashing out units
of happiness in exchange for units of wealth, consequentialists (and courts) are
(finally) able to rest legal analysis on firm theoretical and practical grounds by
straightforwardly holding that actions that increase society’s wealth should be
allowed, while those that reduce it should be forbidden.”162 Hence, logically
extended, a sexual assault can be compensated—or prevented—by the notion of
the potential for significant economic penalties.

157

Id.

Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by Fraud as a
Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 75, 110 (2007).
158

159

Id.

Marco J. Jimenez, The Value of a Promise: A Utilitarian Approach to Contract Law Remedies,
56 UCLA L. Rev. 59, 89–90 (2008).
160

161

Id. at 90 (omission in original).

162

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1

506

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

But, the reality is that criminal law is not like contract law. “Contract law
aspires and provides remedies to breached contracts that are designed to make the
parties whole.”163 For example, imagine a contract between A and B, wherein A
is to produce twenty widgets in a particular manner and then ship the widgets
to B. Now, imagine that four widgets were not made in the manner provided
for in the contract.164 The result is that A would be in breach of the contract,
and B’s remedy is either for A to provide four widgets that meet the contract’s
specifications or for A to pay B for the value of four widgets.165
As illustrated by the hypothetical, the remedy (or “punishment”) for a
breach of contract is monetary damages or, on occasion, specific performance.166
However, the punishment (or “remedy”) for criminal sexual assault is incarceration,
probation, or other punitive sanctions.167 The former are means to compensate
an injured party, most generally through compensatory damages,168 whereas the
latter are rarely awarded in tort actions,169 much less contract-based torts.170 The
latter are means to address the four-pronged purposes of criminal sentencing:
punishment, deterrence, treatment/rehabilitation, and retribution.171
The punishment meted out by criminal laws to those who violate them is
not commensurate to the breach of the victim’s well-being, which may never
feel healed, nor is it sufficient for the violation of public safety such that society
should simply forgive the conduct.172 There is no such connection or capacity for
criminal law to do these things, nor should it be the sole goal of criminal courts
to tend only to the well-being of victims without a consideration of the other
laudable goals of sentencing, which include punishment, deterrence, treatment/

163

Hong, supra note 51, at 324.

164

Id.

165

Id.

Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An Economic
Analysis, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 831, 831 (2006).
166

167

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306 (2018).

See, e.g., Annie Kerrick, Justice is More than Jail: Civil Legal Needs of Sexual Assault Victims,
57 Advocate 38, 40 (2014) (alluding to the multiple avenues in which attorneys and the legal
system can help victims after they have been subjected to sexual assault).
168

169
Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 957, 965
(2007) (“The bottom line is that from the perspective of the tort system overall, punitive damages
have been rare and there does not seem to be any risk of them becoming less rare, even had there
been no tort reform.”).

William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 Duke L.J. 629, 629
(1999) (“The majority of American jurisdictions do not allow punitive damages for breach of
contract unless the breach constitutes an independent tort.”).
170

171

Cohee v. State, 2005 WY 50, ¶¶ 20–22, 110 P.3d 267, 274 (Wyo. 2005).

172

Hong, supra note 51, at 324–25.
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rehabilitation, and retribution/incapacitation.173 Indeed, criminal sentencing
is much larger than notions of penalizing the perpetrator. Instead, concepts of
restorative justice touch upon the ultimate goals of the rehabilitation of offenders
through reconciliation with victims and the community at large. This notion may
not be reachable in the sexual assault context, but it is representative of the larger
purposes of criminal sentencing for the long-term benefit of society. Taken to its
logical extreme, a withdrawal of consent, once given, would require the nownonconsenting party to pay for the change of heart and mind. Worse yet, specific
performance would equate to forced sexual intercourse in the event of a breach of
contract. Certainly, these contract-based notions of compensation are absurd in
this context. Even if one were to assume that compensation, of either the victim
or the perpetrator, was something that could ever be warranted, the notion of
valuation is another issue.
Liability rules represent only an approximation of the value of
the object to its original owner and willingness to pay such an
approximate value is no indication that it is worth more to the
thief than to the owner. In other words, quite apart from the
expense of arriving collectively at such an objective valuation, it
is no guarantee of the economic efficiency of the transfer. If this
is so with property, it is all the more so with bodily integrity,
and we would not presume collectively and objectively to value
the cost of a rape to the victim against the benefit to the rapist
even if economic efficiency is our sole motive. Indeed, when we
approach bodily integrity we are getting close to areas where we
do not let the entitlement be sold at all and where economic
efficiency enters in, if at all, in a more complex way. But even
where the items taken or destroyed are things we do allow to be
sold, we will not without special reasons impose an objective
selling price on the vendor.174
Again, cerebral thinking allows one to acknowledge the theory of an economic
or contract-based approach to sexual assault. However, reality does not agree. An
example may provide the best explanation:
An individual is convicted of attempted rape. The range of acceptable punishments for attempted rape is two to twenty years.
Let us also assume that this crime was committed in a state or
county where it was known that a very low percentage of rape
or attempted rape victims took actions against their perpetrators

173

Id. at 311–12 n.283.

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1125–26 (1972) (footnote omitted).
174
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and pursued criminal charges. In this regard, a very low
percentage of people committing rape or attempted rape end
up being charged with the crime, and an even lower percentage
will be found guilty and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
In light of this low rate, a very high level of punishment may be
required to create sufficiently strong incentives that will convince
potential rapists that they should not commit the crime. Simple
economic calculations support this statement. If there is a 10%
chance of being found guilty and an expected jail time of five
years, then the expected harm to the rapist is a six-month jail
sentence. On the other hand, if the expected jail time is twenty
years, the expected harm is a two-year sentence. According to
simple law and economic principles, the higher expected harm
will create greater incentives not to commit the crime. Given
this information, the judge decides to award twenty years in
an attempt to demonstrate to the community that one found
guilty of attempted rape will face twenty years imprisonment.
This decision to sentence one found guilty of rape or attempted
rape to the highest possible prison term, according to the law
and economics theory previously mentioned, creates stronger
incentives not to commit rapes, and therefore serves as a
deterrent, the other main goal of utilitarianism. This example
demonstrates limiting retributivism’s appeal to deterrence.175
Suffice to say, this hypothetical supports the notion of a case-by-case
assessment for criminal penalties rather than, as its author would urge, a
detached application of economic law. It defies reason to believe that one would
be deterred by the logic of such economics. “Of course, the decision to commit
crime will generally not be a conscious and explicit weighing of costs and
benefits, just as the purchase of a candy bar does not usually involve an explicit
quantification of the benefits and costs.”176
By performing a case-by-case assessment, “the judge can determine the most
appropriate range of punishment in line with the defendant’s culpability and moral
blameworthiness, and the severity of the crime.”177 Due to notions of inability to

175
Matthew Haist, Comment, Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian Goals
Achievable in a World of “Limiting Retributivism”?, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 789, 806–07
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
176
David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner’s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98
Iowa L. Rev. 905, 916 (2013).
177

Haist, supra note 175, at 807 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 806 –08.
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value and an inappropriateness of generalizations, let alone the inappropriateness
of such an attempt, contract law remedies simply are unsuitable in the realm of
criminal sexual assault.

F. Ambiguity Created by Contract Law’s Application to Criminal Sexual Assault
Challenges for vagueness178 and an application of the rule of lenity179 abound
in the criminal arena, and for good reason, as these doctrines protect constitutional
notions of due process.
One aspect of the constitutional concept of due process of law
is represented in the void for vagueness doctrine. The doctrine
applies when a regulatory provision is so vague that it does not
fairly notify affected persons of the conduct which the provision
would sanction. The classic formulation of the void for
vagueness doctrine is as follows: “[A] statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process
of law.”As another court put it, the enactment must “supply
(1) a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited and (2) explicit standards for those
who apply it.”180
Criminal defendants—nay, all citizens—are entitled to advanced warning,
through unambiguous statutes, to the illegality of their conduct. In this way,
society hopes to prevent criminal conduct. The vagueness doctrine of the United
States Constitution requires that, in order to satisfy the Due Process Clause, “a
criminal statute [must] state explicitly and definitely what acts are prohibited, so
as to provide fair warning and preclude arbitrary enforcement.”181

See Cristina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for
Vagueness Doctrine, 8 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 255, 266– 67 (2010) (“Although many
early vagueness cases involved challenges to economic regulations, from its infancy, the void for
vagueness doctrine has also been applied to criminal laws.”).
178

179
See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as A Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885,
886–87 (2004) (“A better justification for the rule of lenity may be found in its role in structuring
the processes of criminal lawmaking and law enforcement. Whereas the conventional rationales
have focused on the perspective of criminal defendants, seeking to guarantee them fair warning
and political access, my analysis will shift to the perspective of voters, emphasizing lenity’s role in
advancing the democratic accountability of criminal justice.”).
180
1 Kenneth A. Manaster & Daniel P. Selmi, State Environmental Law § 5:16 (2017)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Central States Tire Recycling of Neb., LLC v. State, 687 N.W.2d 681,
688 (Neb. 2004)); see also id. § 5:16 n.1; Armijo v. State, 678 P.2d 864, 868 (1984).
181

Vagueness Doctrine, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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Meanwhile, the rule of lenity requires a court to examine a statute’s text to
determine whether the statute is ambiguous.182 “If there is sufficient ambiguity,
the statute is construed narrowly, in favor of the defendant,” as required by
the rule of lenity.183 This rule puts the due process principle of fair notice into
practice, protecting people from liability for crimes they could not have known
were crimes.184
[C]ourts have historically “refused to apply” vague laws “under
the rule that penal statutes should be construed strictly.” Yet “no
one contends that the rule of lenity should apply in the civil
context” where property rights, but not personal liberty, are
at stake. The usual explanation for the differential application
of the rule of lenity is that the court has “expressed greater
tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties
because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less
severe.” . . . [C]ourts have reasoned the rule of lenity need not
apply to “an indefinite civil statute” like it does to a criminal
one because it is “a more serious matter to deprive a man of
his liberty on a prosecution based upon a vague and indefinite
statute than to deprive him of a property right alone.”185
Juxtaposing criminal procedures in place to protect society from an unjust
application of a criminal law statute with contract law, which is governed not
only by statutes (think Uniform Commercial Code) but also hundreds of years
of common law, results in unparalleled confusion. For example, the ambiguity of
legal standards remains a challenge to an analogy between contract and criminal
law.186 In criminal sexual assault law, a threat is measured solely through an
objective lens, while contract law uses both objective and subjective measurements
of a threat.187 “Early contract cases stated that the threat was to be measured from
the victim’s perspective.”188 One early case stated that

182

Rule of Lenity, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

Note, Wisconsin Supreme Court Applies Sexual Assault Statute to Attempted Sexual Intercourse
with A Corpse: State v. Grunke, 752 N.W.2d 769 (Wis. 2008), 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1780, 1785 (2009)
(footnote omitted).
183

184
Joel S. Nolette, Towards an Administrative Rule of Lenity: Restoring the Constitutional
Congress by Reforming Statutory Interpretation, 19 Federalist Soc’y Rev. 16, 24–26 (2018).
185
Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted) (quoting, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551,
2568 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Sash v. Zenk, 439 F.3d 61, 65 (2d. Cir. 2006); Gen. Const.
Co. v. Connally, 3 F.2d 666, 667 (W.D. Okla. 1924)); see also id. at 24–25 nn.101–04.
186

Spence, supra note 41, at 77.

187

Id. at 80– 81.

188

Id. at 81 (footnote omitted).
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[p]ersons of a “weak or cowardly nature” are the very ones that
need protection. The courageous can usually protect themselves.
Capricious and timid persons are generally the ones that are
influenced by threats, and it would be a great injustice to permit
them to be robbed by the unscrupulous because they are so
unfortunately constituted.189
Beginning with the above-stated notions of protecting the weak, contract
law muddies the waters even further: The introduction of the duty of good
faith in the Uniform Commercial Code now also suggests a measurement
from the threat-maker’s perspective.190 And, some argue that subjective intent
should be “measured objectively through the wider lens of the ‘totality of the
circumstances.’”191 The result is a debate as to the best perspective by which
to measure the existence of a rape, which serves only to create confusion. The
debate naturally raises questions as to whether the perpetrator of a sexual assault
is to be judged upon objective or subjective criteria and, if subjective, then whose?
The result is a situation where, under contract-based principles, a determination
of the happening of a sexual assault is based on context. The ambiguity thus
created is unfair to the perpetrator and the victim alike.
Further, in contract law, pending disputes are governed by rules of inter
pretation that have been crafted over centuries of precedent.192 These contractual
axioms or, ”rules of interpretation,” have assumed a controlling significance in
the results of contract-based disputes: Because one interprets a contract (and its
terms) against the drafter, the party who drafted the contract will always lose
when the contract is called into controversy.193 In contract law, when faced with
an ambiguous contract, or term, courts construe the ambiguity against the party
responsible for its provision in the contract.194 “This canon of construction,
known as contra proferentem, ‘provides that ‘[i]n choosing among the reasonable
meanings of a promise or agreement . . . that meaning is generally preferred
which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing
otherwise proceeds.’”195 This rule makes sense considering that the contract’s
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author is advantageously positioned to determine the language of the contract
and “fairness requires as a matter of law that the bigger piece of the contract ‘pie’
not go to the slicer.”196
But who “drafts” the sexual intercourse contract? The result of an application
of contract law to sexual assault necessarily lends to greater ambiguity that does
a disservice both to the perpetrator and the victim of sexual assault. Accordingly,
should one traverse the path of applying contract law to sexual assault cases, the
Due Process Clause may so interfere as to render statutes void for vagueness or to
abolish the rule of lenity.
Sexual assault is already an area of criminal law fraught with claims of
confusion and ambiguity.197 According to one commentator, criminal sexual
assault reform demands that “the kaleidoscope of intimate discourse—passion,
emotional turmoil, entreaties, flirtation, provocation, demureness—must give
way to cool-headed contractual sex.”198 To muddy the waters with notions of
statutory and common-law contract application would serve only to worsen an
already hotly debated topic.

IV. The Comparison Proves True:
The Complexity of the Marriage Contract
The complexity of consent to sex versus assent to a contract has resulted
in inconsistent, and likely unforeseen, results. For example, with the permission
of a parent or judge, a minor girl can marry her adult partner. Thus, minors
may consent to marriage through parental or judicial consent before they are
legally old enough to consent to sex.199 This result remains despite strides made in
overcoming the marital-rape exemption.
Another common law origin which was a building-block in the
foundation for the marital rape exemption was the idea that a
husband owned his wife as chattel. Since a husband could not
take what he already owned, a husband was no more capable of
raping his wife than an owner was of stealing his own property.
Since women were regarded as property, the common law treated
rape not as a crime against women, but rather as a violation of
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a man’s property interest. The rape laws were concerned with
protecting a husband’s property interest in his wife’s fidelity, and
a father’s interest in his daughter’s virginity.200
“The notion of women as property, however, was founded on premises
which are no longer prevalent in American society and which have strongly been
rejected.”201 And yet, proponents of the rape-contract comparison must recognize
that the historical view of marriage as a contract was precisely what supported the
marital-rape exemption.202
An unsupported, extrajudicial statement made by British jurist,
Sir Matthew Hale gave birth to the marital rape exemption at
common law when he declared “[b]ut the husband cannot be
guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife,
for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife
hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she
cannot retract.”203
This statement and its basis in contract law traditionally have been accepted
as the foundation for spousal immunity.204
The most common rationale for the marital rape exemption is
Hale’s notion that a marriage constitutes a contract. The terms
of this contract include a wife’s irrevocable consent to have
sexual intercourse with her husband, whenever he wishes. This
has fostered the notion that a husband has a “marital right” to
sexual intercourse. According to the theory of implied consent,
marital rape can never occur because all sexual contact within a
marriage is assumed to be consensual.205
Indeed, it has always been recognized that marital contracts, and its attend
ant “obligations,” are not equivalent to non-marital contractual relationships and
obligations.206 One significant difference between the two is that the state is an
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interested party in the former but not the latter.207 Traditionally, a marriage contract
was irrevocable, and sexual intercourse with one’s husband was an obligation
under it. This was because the marital contract recognized sex as “an established
right,” so spousal rape was simply the “exercise of a contractual right.”208 Thus,
as is apparent with the marital-rape exemption, an application of contract law
principles to this area would constitute a return to the archaic societal notions of
treating humans as property, a concept long since rejected in virtually every aspect
of civilized society.209
However, one may just as easily conclude that a matrimonial contract is not
a valid contract at all. “[I]ts provisions are unwritten, its penalties unspecified,
and the terms of the contract are typically unknown to the ‘contracting’ parties.
Prospective spouses are neither informed of the terms of the contract nor are
they allowed any options about these terms.”210 Two further arguments discredit
the contract theory: first, under contract law, private parties generally are not
permitted to use self-help methods to remedy a contract breach.211 Second, the
remedy for breach of contract for personal services is not specific performance.212
“Personal services are unique, and contract law does not require a person to perform
against her will.”213 Hence, even if it were to be accepted that a spouse breached
the marital contract by not having sexual intercourse with the other spouse,
the latter should not be permitted to enforce the contract by physically forcing
the former to have sexual intercourse. The fact that the matrimonial “contract”
does not resemble a true contract at all is one of the strongest legal arguments
for the outright rejection of spousal immunity.214 An economic analysis treats
marriage merely as the “structure” within which rational individuals negotiate
self-interested agreements concerning sexual relations (and more).215 Marriage is
much more than merely a contract.216 While it involves personal and societal
notions of commitment, sacrifice, support, and dedication—all of which could
be recognized in a contractual context—it is also intricately intertwined with love,
personal choice, and subjective emotions—concepts far from the objective theory
of contracts.
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V. Conclusion
Application of an economic-based approach, reminiscent of contract law, to
criminal sexual assault fails for several reasons.217 The economic models hinge
on the notions of efficiency and maximized utility, but the personal choices of
consensual sexual relations involve much more than a purely analytical, wealthbased decision for which there is no universal norm.218 Although economics
provides a vocabulary for describing many of the factors that complicate these
models in the real world, a careful analysis of these problems highlights the
enormous practical constraints on any system of human relations, including
consensual sexual ones.219 A contract-based approach to sexual relations depends
on criteria that are not based on efficiency, as contract law never bridges the gap
between economic theory and the many complex realities of consensual sexual
relations, let alone nonconsensual sexual relations.
Given the comparisons and contrasts between contract law, under prevailing
economic theories, and criminal law, specifically as applied to sexual assault,
these areas of law have no place being compared and synthesized in determining
how to equate, determine, and remedy whether sexual assault has occurred.
“Rape is necessarily and essentially an act of . . . self-aggrandizement, while
sexual communion mutually entered into connotes and communicates love,
respect and a gift of physical pleasure.”220 As a result, the laws surrounding sexual
assault are unique in nature, and are certainly separate and distinct from a strict
application of contract law. Examining the law of contracts and the law of sexual
assault inherently infers that the two dichotomies do not create a cohesive pair.
To construe the two principles together would be to disservice the law and to
muddle vastly divergent concepts of what it is to offer, accept, reject, or withdraw
an agreement.
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